Ukraine's Victory: The Ideal and the Real in International Law and Politics (Reflections on Richard Haas's article ‘The Perfect Has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine’).

Richard Haass's article in Foring Affairs provoked a mixed reaction among political scientists and political observers, mostly negative, because of the proposal to reconsider the approach to determining Ukraine's victory in the armed conflict with Russia, to consider two stages of diplomacy to end this armed conflict.

The article by Richard Haass in a prestigious publication deserves attention because it addresses issues that are currently being actively discussed with regard to the end of the war in Ukraine and the formation of the political position of the US Republican Party, whose leader has won the next presidential race.

It will be interesting to see in the near future whether Haass has emphasised a particular Republican position and whether his views coincide with those that will shape the course of US foreign policy next year and in the medium term.

It is worth noting that Richard Haass served as Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations from 2003 to 2023, of which he is currently President Emeritus. A veteran of the US diplomatic corps and national security establishment, Haass has held a number of senior positions in the White House, the State Department and the Department of Defence. He was director of policy planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003. He also served as President George W. Bush's Special Envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. From 1989 to 1993, he was Special Assistant to President George H.W. Bush and Senior Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council. Richard Haass is the author of: ‘The Pain of Commitment: Ten Habits of Good Citizens?’ ‘The World: A Short Introduction, and others’.

But let us turn to The Haass's draft for a diplomatic settlement of the armed conflict in Ukraine.

The first stage of such a settlement, according to The Haass, is a ceasefire on the line of contact and the withdrawal of troops. The duration of the ceasefire can vary, even up to 50 years, following the example of Cyprus.

The second stage, after the first, to determine the final status of the territories, could be "much longer - perhaps decades, until Russia has a post-Putin leadership interested in reintegrating the country into the West. It will involve additional agreements.... This phase could include territorial movements in both directions and a degree of autonomy for the people of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. It would also include a security guarantee for Ukraine... Ideally, such a guarantee would include NATO membership for Kyiv. But a coalition of the willing, including the United States, could offer Ukraine security guarantees if NATO members are unwilling to accept Ukraine.

The Haass stresses the aggressor's advantage in material equipment, use of modern weapons and human resources in an armed conflict, and is critical of Ukraine's ability to reach the 1991 borders.

In particular, he notes: '...there is no game-changing weapon or restriction that would allow Ukraine to simultaneously defend what it already controls and liberate what it does not. Many analysts refuse to publicly acknowledge these realities, in part because they fear it will embolden Russia and demoralise Ukraine. But formulating an impossible definition of victory creates its own political problems... The West, say (American and European sceptics), is spending tens of billions of dollars on a policy that has little chance of success and threatens to reduce its willingness to do so in other ways theatres of war where, according to some analysts, greater US interests are at stake. Essentially, we lack the capacity to produce the number of weapons Ukraine needs to win the war,' wrote Republican vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance in April. These weapons,' he continued, 'are not just for Ukraine.

The Haass’s opinion on territorial concessions to the aggressor, which recognises the occupation of Ukraine's territory through a prolonged cessation of hostilities, is in direct contradiction to international law on the sovereignty of states, the preservation of territorial integrity, and the condemnation of both aggression and the use of force in the settlement of international conflicts.

Historical experience shows that realpolitik has a limited ability to resolve conflicts in the world. International law loses its effectiveness, its power to resolve conflicts and punish aggressors, when the aggressor continues to demonstrate force, including the use of nuclear weapons. It is this aspect that characterises what is known in realpolitik as the art of the possible.

But is this the art of the possible if it is used to end the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, to win, as Richard Haass writes?

Who and when has thoroughly verified, based on facts and reliable information, the real capabilities of Russia to continue its aggression, provided that Ukraine is supplied with stable, timely and necessary supplies of weapons and military equipment?

Who and when in Ukraine and in the West prepared a realistic plan to repel Russia's armed aggression, with justification of each position necessary for warfare?

Who, and when, drew up the map of hostilities and concluded, on the basis of a rigorous, professional analysis without the use of political templates and on the basis of objective information, that the aggressor would conduct offensive operations in an unrestrained, prolonged and successful manner?

Who has presented a clear analysis with proposals for strengthening the capabilities of the personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including through effective mobilisation, training and raising the level of military discipline and military law and order to a level that would fully ensure combat capability and real repulsion of aggression?

After all, who can say that the aggressor is ready to comply with any ceasefire agreements, that certain agreements will have the force of law, unlike what happened in the history associated with the Budapest Memorandum?

The art of the possible in politics and diplomacy must be guided by law, by international law, without which art loses its artistic character and becomes brutal, reminiscent of discord and chaos.

Shouldn't we propose a not ideal but realistic way to end the armed conflict unleashed by the aggressor in Ukraine, using all legal, political, economic, financial and, of course, military capabilities, which today and in the future should be much greater than those of the aggressor?

The ideal victory of Ukraine - the expulsion of the invaders from the occupied territories - can become a real victory if the democratic world really and strongly supports the victim of aggression, which is Ukraine. This support, which would not lead to a ceasefire on the line of contact with the recognition of the occupied territory as such, thus ceding it to the aggressor, but would consist in taking tough measures against the very attempts of aggression, annexation, attempts to seize other people's territories, attempts to destroy the sovereignty and to establish new borders in Europe through the use of armed force.

With this approach, if the aggressor feels an effective counterforce, it will enter into negotiations to end the conflict, to stop the aggression on terms acceptable to the civilised world, where international law should be enforced, not proclaimed.

Reflecting on Richard Haas' publication allows us to draw a conclusion that is known to be the most perfect in human history - those who try to run away from the battle are the first to be defeated.

It is not the United States or European countries that are fighting the aggressor, but Ukraine, whose support has clear and understandable qualitative and quantitative characteristics and involves the necessary costs for the future of humanity. These are not pompous statements, they are not aspirations to an ideal, they are acceptance of the struggle for the future of humanity as it is, acceptance of the struggle to win it here in Ukraine, where a local conflict has every chance of not becoming a prologue to the destruction of humanity.

Between the lines of Richard Haas' publication, however, one can read the following - we must continue to help Ukraine with all our might and with all the means at our disposal, which will allow us to exhaust the aggressor to the point where the point of waging an aggressive war will be lost for a long time, if not forever.

In such circumstances, we can think about the diplomacy of two stages of ending the armed conflict proposed by The Hague. The implementation of such stages will ensure the final victory after an indefinite period of time, but a real, though not perfect, victory for Ukraine, based on the preservation of international law, without its total destruction by Russia during the aggression.

Pavlo Bohutskyi for 'Ukrainian Law